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By ALEXANDER GUNEY*
Introduction
CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL ONCE EXPLAINED that a “corpora-
tion is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law.”1 He continued that as a legal fiction, a corpo-
ration possesses only those rights and powers that are conferred upon
it through its creation—expressly or incidental to its purpose.2 There
has been a shift in this view since Chief Justice Marshall’s proclama-
tion in the 1800s.3 Recently, courts have extended First Amendment
rights to corporations.4 Seemingly in conflict with this expansion of
rights, courts have previously identified “purely personal” constitu-
tional guarantees unavailable to corporations, which “depend[ ] on
the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provi-
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1. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
2. Id.
3. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (rejecting
the argument that corporations should be treated differently under the First Amendment
because such associations are not natural persons); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (“Such corpora-
tions can be ‘persons’ exercising religion for purposes of the statute. Second, as a matter of
constitutional law, Free Exercise may extend to some for-profit organizations.”); Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) (finding nothing in the text of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) or existing Supreme Court precedent that
would preclude a corporation from exercising religious rights).
4. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342–43.
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sion.”5 To settle this conflict, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari in two cases to address whether the First Amend-
ment permits a corporation to seek exemption from the Affordable
Care Act’s (ACA) contraception mandate as an impermissible in-
fringement on its free exercise of religion.6
This Comment will analyze the contraception cases by using theo-
ries explained in The Commonplace of the Law: Stories from Everyday Life
that identify and reconcile competing approaches regarding the
meaning and efficacy of law in contemporary society.7 The Common-
place of the Law explores the intersection of law and society, and
presents three theories that demonstrate how society’s perception of
the law impacts its outcome.8 This approach is a significant departure
from a classic jurisprudential analysis. A hybrid approach, examining
the issues from a philosophical, sociological, and functional perspec-
tive, helps understand not only the legal result, but also the Court’s
underlying intellectual journey. A fuller understanding of the forces
at play in the U.S. legal system rationalizes the emerging jurispru-
dence and provides a framework for challenging the inherent struc-
ture. Part I argues that the First Amendment protects a corporation’s
practice of religion using the philosophy of Franz Kafka’s parable
“Before the Law.”9 Part II explores how a corporation can work with
the law by using its financial resources and the established socio-legal
system to manipulate unprecedented outcomes. Part III identifies how
amici briefs, with the aid of personal stories from affected parties,
work against the law to disrupt the existing power structure. Ulti-
mately, this Comment argues that the use of storytelling provides a
middle ground that harmonizes the frameworks presented in Kafka’s
5. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978).
6. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759
(“[D]ecid[ing] whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1 et seq., permits the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to demand that three closely held corporations provide health-insurance coverage
for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the compa-
nies’ owners.”).
7. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
8. JOHN J. BONSIGNORE ET AL., BEFORE THE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
PROCESS xi–xii (8th ed. 2006).
9. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL: DEFINITIVE EDITION (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Alfred A.
Knopf, A Division of Random House, Inc. 1984) (1937), reprinted in BONSIGNORE ET AL.,
supra note 8, at xiii–xv. Franz Kafka was a Czechoslovakian-born lawyer and writer, who
often found the practice of law conflicted with his philosophical views, which permeate
much of his writing.
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parable—“Before the Law,” “With the Law,” and “Against the Law.”10
This Comment contributes to the expanding body of literature con-
cerned with the perceived recent corporatization of U.S. constitu-
tional law. The Comment calls for additional research into the
subjective effect of legal outcomes on individuals and calls for the de-
velopment of an approach better able to present these impacts, in the
hopes of creating a more responsive judiciary.
I. Before the Law
This section considers the issues raised before the Supreme Court
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby11 and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Burwell12 (collectively Burwell) with the help of Franz Kafka’s parable,
“Before the Law.”13 Although a nearly century old parable might not
be considered a conventional analytical tool, Kafka’s story captures
the profound psychological effect that law, as an institution, delivers.
In the story, a man begs for admittance to “the Law,” but the door-
keeper maintains that he cannot admit the man.14 The doorkeeper
explains that he is but one of many doorkeepers, all of which are
more powerful than him.15 The man thinks that the Law “should be
accessible to every man and at all times,” but after hearing that behind
the first door are other doorkeepers, the man decides to wait for per-
mission.16 The man waits for years, occasionally engaging in brief con-
versation with the doorkeeper, but eventually dies waiting for
admittance.17 Just before the man dies he asks the doorkeeper why, in
all the years he waited before the Law, nobody else had come seeking
admittance.18 The doorkeeper responds: “No one but you could gain
admittance through this door, since this door was intended only for
you. I am now going to shut it.”19
The parable is intentionally enigmatic and illustrates the dual na-
ture of Kafka’s concept of legality.20 On the one hand, law is objective,
10. Id.
11. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
12. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
13. KAFKA, supra note 9.
14. Id. at xiii.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at xiv.
19. Id.
20. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 75.
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impartial, and indifferent “to the particularities of biography and per-
sonality.”21 Kafka’s story places the man perpetually outside of the
Law and unable to gain admittance.22 The man is not alone in his view
that the law is remote and separate from one’s daily life.23 On the
other hand, the parable reveals the illusory nature of the law’s author-
ity, which the man’s cooperation and deference sustain.24 While re-
maining outside of the Law, the doorkeeper reveals the vital and
direct connection between the man and the law; indeed, the door was
intended only for the man.25 Thus, standing before the law gives it an
authority that is severed and independent of the social practices and
relationships that enable it.26 Despite its direct connection with indi-
viduals, the law appears “external, unified, and objective.”27 Law and
daily life are “seen in juxtaposition and possibly opposition, rather
than connected and entwined.”28 The man died before the Law be-
cause he mistakenly believed entering required some special permis-
sion, when in reality the entrance was intended only for the man and
closed upon his death.29
Underlying Kafka’s parable is the concept of reification—a pro-
cess that legitimizes abstract concepts by treating them as though they
were real, concrete manifestations.30 Thus, the man gives the law the
power to exclude him by conceptualizing it as something concrete
and substantive. The man’s death highlights this power transfer.31
When standing before the law, people do not see themselves as the
authors of the law, but rather see the law as authors of individuals,
their behaviors, needs, desires, and values.32 The reification process
separates law from daily life through the loss of agency of the individ-
ual.33 This is illustrated through the invocation of “supernatural be-
ings as causal agents determining the affairs of the world,” which is
21. Id. at 76.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 61, 68 (telling stories of Rita Michaels and Dwayne Franklin, who describe
their perception of the courts as distanced from and outside of their daily life).
24. Id. at 75.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 76.
29. Id. at 77.
30. Id. at 78–79.
31. Id. at 79.
32. Id. at 80.
33. Id. (“[P]eople endow the law with the capacity to construct those persons and
groups.”).
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the quintessential example of reification.34 When standing before the
law, the law becomes a supernatural being that dictates life, rather
than a human-created system of organization and regulation.35
Viewing the legal issue presented in Burwell—whether a corpora-
tion can seek an exemption from the ACA’s contraception mandate
on religious grounds36—through the lens of Kafka’s parable supports
the view that a corporation can hold and practice religious beliefs.
The judicial ability to confer constitutional rights upon non-human
entities can be understood as the result of the reification process,
which is evident in First Amendment precedent.37
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, a seminal First Amend-
ment case, the Court held that First Amendment protection extends
to corporations.38 To reach this conclusion, the Court reified the First
Amendment: “The proper question therefore is not whether corpora-
tions ‘have’ First Amendment rights. . . . Instead, the question must be
whether [the statute in question] abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.”39 The Court, through a reified
First Amendment, extends rights intended for the protection of indi-
viduals to serve the corporate fallacy.40
The Court’s reasoning in Bellotti closely mirrors the reasoning
seen in Kafka’s “Before the Law.” In the same way that the man cre-
ated the power that he is controlled by, and ultimately succumbed to,
the Court in Bellotti is constrained by its own construction of the First
Amendment. The Law, which is the First Amendment in Bellotti,
gained independence from its creators.41 By rewording the issue—
shifting the focus of the inquiry away from the corporation and to-
ward the constitutional guarantees—the Court changed the First
Amendment from a set of rights that a corporation may possess to a
34. Id. at 81.
35. Id. at 82 (“[D]ehumanization is achieved by locating power within social institu-
tions, such as the law, the state, the economy . . . .”).
36. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
37. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (“The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”).
38. Id. at 776.
39. Id.
40. Nadia Imtanes, Should Corporations Be Entitled to the Same First Amendment Protections
As People?, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 203, 214–15 (2012); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward,
17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
41. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 80 (“Rather than seeing persons as the authors of
the law, people understand the law as the author of individuals . . . .”).
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causal agent that compelled protection.42 The Court subtly shifts from
a view of the First Amendment as something that a corporation may
or may not “have” to an interpretation in which the First Amendment
protects a set of rights.43 Thus, the First Amendment becomes a causal
actor that protects, rather than just an abstract ideal. The uncertainty
regarding the appropriate conception of the First Amendment is
identifiable in the Third and Tenth Circuit’s distinct inquiries, and
helps account for the competing outcomes in Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga.44
Once law is reified, it obtains a sense of impartiality and objectiv-
ity; it disassociates from the historical, biographical, and social influ-
ences, and thus is not self-interested.45 As an impartial entity,
independent of its creators, the reification process leads to an under-
standing of the First Amendment as located within a set of rules and
regulations that “seem to produce effects independent of human ac-
tion and afford legal decision makers little choice in interpreting. . .
matters before them.”46
The lack of power is highlighted in Citizens United v. FEC, where
the Court relied on Bellotti to overturn previously upheld limits on
corporate expenditures.47 The Court, by asserting the constraints
placed upon it by the First Amendment, struck down two prior cases,
demonstrating that the law by “limit[ing] and constrain[ing] human
action also makes action possible.”48 Like the man in Kafka’s parable
who ascribes ultimate power to the gatekeeper, the Supreme Court,
42. Id. at 79 (“In part, reification is achieved through language.”).
43. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
44. The Third and Tenth Circuits appear to articulate different conceptions of the
First Amendment’s proper analytical role. The Tenth Circuit concluded that corporations
enjoy religious protection after framing the inquiry as “requir[ing] us to determine
whether the [RFRA] and the Free Exercise Clause protect the plaintiffs.” Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678
(2013). The Third Circuit, on the other hand, concluded that corporations do not enjoy
religious protection after framing the inquiry as “whether a for-profit, secular corporation
is able to engage in religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment and RFRA.” Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
45. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 83 (“When people describe what we are calling
reified legality, they repeatedly refer to the law as impartial and objective.”).
46. Id. at 88.
47. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 355 (2010) (quoting Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. at 792 n.31) (“‘[T]he First Amendment protects the right of corporations to
petition legislative and administrative bodies.’”).
48. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 91. Interestingly, Citizens United, a 2010 case, over-
turned a 2003 case and a 1990 case, by relying on a 1978 Supreme Court case, Bellotti.
While Bellotti was binding on all three decisions, the dynamic factor was the composition of
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too, evokes the First Amendment’s plenary reach, but in a more selec-
tive and calculated manner.
The opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, echoes the view of the
First Amendment as a causal actor, rather than as a set of rights.
“There is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment, as
originally understood, would permit the suppression of political
speech by media corporations.”49 The Court boldly suggests, without
any precedential support, the central idea of reification—that the
First Amendment is the author of individuals, rather than individuals
being authors of the First Amendment.50 As such, the First Amend-
ment has the power to permit or to prohibit certain actions, leaving
the Court only the incidental power to announce what the First
Amendment does and does not find permissible. That power—which
the Court assigned to the First Amendment in Bellotti51—both obli-
gates and constrains judicial action in much the same way that the
man in Kafka’s parable both gave power to, and was controlled by, the
law.52
Further, this lack of influence can be seen in the multiple door-
keepers. In Kafka’s parable, the first doorkeeper is only one in a series
of increasingly powerful doorkeepers that “renders unnecessary, the
authority of any particular doorkeeper.”53 Since the Supreme Court is
constrained by the principle of stare decisis, lower courts deny any
power to issue holdings contrary to the superior doorkeeper.54 The
Tenth Circuit opinion in Hobby Lobby explains that it sees “no reason
the Supreme Court would recognize constitutional protection for a
corporation’s political expression but not its religious expression.”55
This abdication of power to superior doorkeepers, like in Kafka’s par-
able, is illusory, since other courts have reached the opposite
conclusion.56
the Supreme Court. This further illustrates that the constraints on law—precedent—can
be used to make action possible.
49. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353.
50. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 80.
51. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
52. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 75.
53. Id. at 89.
54. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
55. Id. (referencing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–55
(2010)).
56. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (“[T]he
Free Exercise Clause necessitates the conclusion that a for-profit, secular corporation can-
not engage in the exercise of religion.”).
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How, then, do two courts, both representing the doorkeepers in
Kafka’s parable, come to entirely opposite views on the same issue?
This difference is attributable to a second view in the parable, referred
to as With the Law.57 Whereas Before the Law envisions law as sepa-
rate from everyday life, With the Law sees the law as being “enframed
by everyday life.”58
II. With the Law
With the Law is a theory that understands legality as a tool that
may be used to further one’s own self-interests.59 In contrast with
Before the Law, which envisions legality as outside of everyday life,60
With the Law frames the law as a collection of actors, organizations,
rules, and procedures that can be used to manage daily life.61 Where
the reification process removes any self-interest and frames law as ob-
jective and impartial, With the Law recognizes self-interest as a legiti-
mate end.62 In doing so, the ability to use the law to serve one’s own
interests “encompasses an understanding of legality as available to
others as well.”63 Thus, when law is placed in the social context of
everyday life, it is no longer objective and impartial, and legal out-
comes “must be open ended and dependent upon the particularities
of each case.”64
In this sense, the law may be viewed as a game, in which the rules
are “designed with degrees of freedom around which outcomes are
produced but not predetermined.”65 The rules of the game also dic-
tate relevance.66 For example, a game of checkers may be played with
marble divots or bottle caps, so long as each player can identify her
pieces and the other material rules are followed.67 This provides free-
dom while ensuring some formal equality and closure to the issues.68
The duality of law reappears in With the Law through the paradoxical
guarantees of contingent outcomes and formal closure.69 With the
57. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 108.
58. Id. at 48.
59. Id. at 131.
60. Id. at 129.
61. Id. at 131.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 136.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 136–37.
68. Id. at 131.
69. Id. at 146.
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Law, or a game-like view of legality, creates a space within which ac-
tion can occur, as opposed to Before the Law, where the law exists
outside of daily life and power is abdicated.70
In the game-like view, the “rules of due process provided by the
American Constitution and elaborated through statutes and court de-
cisions provide a means of keeping the substance of decisions uncer-
tain while simultaneously ensuring that some outcome will be
produced.”71 This game-like view of the law is exemplified in Conestoga
Wood, where the Third Circuit appears to announce its deviation from
the set path that corporations receive protection under the First
Amendment.72 Whereas the Tenth Circuit renounces any power to
challenge the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby,73 the Third Circuit in
Conestoga Wood follows the game-like approach and uses the “rules,” or
in this circumstance case law, to create space (contingency) in which
the court may issue a formal ruling (closure).74 Interestingly, Conestoga
Wood relied on Bellotti to limit First Amendment protection, whereas
Citizens United used it to expand First Amendment protection to
corporations.75
In following the formal rules of due process, the Conestoga Wood
decision highlights another aspect of the game-like theory—the brack-
eting of the everyday world.76 Even though With the Law is situated
within daily life, the rules “do not neatly correspond to the rules and
70. Id. (“Whereas a reified view of law understands substantive guidelines . . . as limit-
ing and at times preempting human action, the game-like view . . . interprets rules as
creating space . . . within which action can occur and advantage be taken.”).
71. Id. at 147.
72. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 383–84 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (quoting
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1987) (“Thus, we must con-
sider whether the Free Exercise Clause has historically protected corporations, or whether
the ‘guarantee is “purely personal” or is unavailable to corporations’ based on the ‘nature,
history, and purpose of [this] particular constitutional provision.’”)).
73. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (“We see no reason the Supreme Court would recognize
constitutional protection for a corporation’s political expression but not its religious
expression.”).
74. Compare Conestoga, 724 F.3d 377 (citing Citizens United thirteen times within a ten
page span), with Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (citing Citizens United only twice in a forty-seven
page majority opinion).
75. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 383 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14); Zachary J. Phil-
lipps, Non-Profits: Why For-Profit, Secular Corporations Cannot Exercise Religion within the Mean-
ing of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 39, 58 (2014) (relying on Bellotti, and
distinguishing Citizens United on the grounds that Supreme Court precedent supported the
position that there is a long history of protecting corporations’ rights to free speech) (em-
phasis added).
76. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 141.
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norms that operate elsewhere in social life.”77 The rules of due pro-
cess “distinguish the law’s moral space from the everyday sphere of
action where the pursuit of self-interest may be modulated by ethical
considerations. . . .”78 In other words, the framework of law allows
people to ignore—and perhaps act contrary to—the moral rules that
govern daily life and replace them with the rules of the courts.
The contraception cases illustrate this bracketing. Surprisingly
absent from Conestoga Wood, and Hobby Lobby for that matter, is any
discussion of the parties directly impacted by the decisions—women.79
Underlying both opinions is the moral interest in preserving public
health and ending gender discrimination, however, neither case dis-
cusses at any length the impacts of the decision on women.80 The
rules that dictate relevance in the game-like theory also “suspend or
render irrelevant many of the [moral] everyday constraints on unmiti-
gated self-interestedness, such as ethical or practical considerations
dictating some degree of empathy or reciprocity.”81 Thus, even
though the decision in Conestoga Wood may be more beneficial to the
groups impacted, it is difficult to identify protection of women’s rights
as the motivating factor.82
This ability to bracket morality also underscores a criticism of
With the Law. In With the Law, the rules of the game specify what
does and does not matter.83 As such, the moral impact on women is
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See generally Karen Gantt, Balancing Women’s Health and Religious Freedom Under the
ACA, 17 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1 (2013–2014) (considering the numerous lawsuits filed
by religious organizations over the contraceptive mandate in the context of the tension
between the government’s ability to legislate for the public interest and religious liberty).
80. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006) (“Govern-
ment may substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion only if it demonstrates
application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering the governmental inter-
est.”); Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 412 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (“Preserving public health and
ending gender discrimination are indeed of tremendous societal significance.”); Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct.
678 (2013) (“The government asserts two interests here: ‘the interest in [1] public health
and [2] gender equality.’ Aple. Br. at 34.”); Adam Sonfield, Contraception: An Integral Compo-
nent of Preventative Care for Women, 13 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 2, 4 (2010), available at http:/
/www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/13/2/gpr130202.pdf (discussing the social, economic,
and medical costs of unintended pregnancies).
81. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 141.
82. Phillipps, supra note 75, at 58 (“The Third Circuit relied on cases emphasizing
religious liberty for individuals in concluding that no such history existed for corporations.”).
83. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 136.
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not the focus of the framework of Free Exercise claims.84 It is because
of this that the game-like theory of legality results in the commodifica-
tion of the law.85 Lawyers are seen as “experienced gamesmen who
shape the process of justice.”86 First, the rules of the game are not
easily understood, which favors those familiar with the game.87 And,
to the extent that the rules of the game may be even-handed or favor
the “have-nots,” the game’s organization and the imbalance in re-
sources favor repeat players or those representing the “culturally dom-
inant interests.”88
The Supreme Court’s recognition of an increasingly expansive
First Amendment and a legal system driven by self-interest create am-
ple opportunity for corporations to assert religious exemptions. Selec-
tive challenges to “morally questionable issues” become more
effective,89 and have the potential to drastically alter well-established
constitutional precedent. Against the Law suggests an approach—fo-
cusing on the stories of individuals impacted by the Court’s corporate-
centric decisions—that can better focus judicial decision making and
restore to the law a much needed human element.
III. Against the Law
Whereas Before the Law and With the Law envision legality as
having some relationship with daily life—either independent from it90
or enframed by it91—Against the Law sees participation in legality
through resistance of the law.92 This resistance takes several forms—
retaining a sense of dignity and humor during legal proceedings, ex-
acting revenge, or avoiding the law and its costs, even if only momen-
tarily.93 Resistance of the law is defined through three key features:
84. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006) (“Govern-
ment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion . . . .”).
85. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 142–43 (discussing Alan Fox, who views his legal
skills as a commodity to be distributed at his will).
86. Id. at 153.
87. BONSIGNORE ET AL., supra note 8, at 86. (“Finally, the rules are sufficiently complex
and problematic . . . that differences in the quantity and quality of legal services will affect
capacity to derive advantages from the rules.”).
88. Id.
89. Gantt, supra note 79, at 29.
90. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 47. (“[L]egality is envisioned and enacted as if it
were a separate sphere from ordinary social life . . . .”).
91. Id. at 48. (“Rather than being discontinuous from everyday life and its concerns,
the law is enframed by everyday life.”).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 48–49.
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first, an understanding of a power disparity; second, a consciousness
of opportunity; and third, an assessment of the disparity and available
opportunities.94 In contrast to standing Before the Law, resistance
sees legality as an “ascendant power to which one conforms.”95 Rather
than viewing legality as a game, it is a “net in which [people] are
trapped and within which they struggle for freedom.”96
In “plotting to remake an unfair situation as it stands, resistance
lies at the intersection of the power of legality and the possibilities for
escaping it.”97 Those who stand against the law experience “law’s fail-
ure to acknowledge or take their situations into account as subverting,
rather than ensuring, justice.”98 Legality is not blind, as in the reified
view of law; instead, legality “is whatever those with power—the judge,
the police, the utility company, the supervisor—say is legal.”99 Thus,
resistance may be a conscious attempt to reunite legality and
justice.100
In terms of the three defining features of resistance, the amici
brief for Lambda Legal (hereafter “Lambda Legal” or “amici brief”)
presents interesting arguments that should be classified as resis-
tance.101 Indeed, the arguments demonstrate a consciousness of an
inequality in power, an opportunity to intervene, and an assessment of
imbalance that produced the situation.102 Lambda Legal’s ultimate ar-
gument focuses on the impact of the Supreme Court’s review of the
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga cases: “Granting the Companies the exemp-
tions they seek would. . . open the door to increased use of religion to
deny LGBT persons, those with HIV, and other vulnerable minorities
equal compensation, health care access, and other equitable treat-
ment in commercial interactions.”103
94. Id. at 183.
95. Id. at 183–84.
96. Id. at 184.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 190.
99. Id. at 191.
100. Id. at 193 (“Other respondents also described encounters that undermined their
sense of any connection between legality and justice . . . .”).
101. Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting the Government, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, 133 S. Ct. 641 (2012) (No. 13-354),
2014 WL 334441 [hereinafter Brief for Lambda Legal].
102. Id. at *3–7.
103. Id. at *6–7.
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A. Understanding of a Power Disparity
A consciousness of being less powerful in a relationship of power
requires a “particular understanding or positioning of self and others,
of being up against something or someone.”104 In the amici brief,
Lambda Legal identifies itself as “the nation’s leading nonprofit advo-
cacy organization working to protect and advance civil rights of les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people.”105 The amici
originated to challenge a range of inequalities, from employment dis-
crimination to disparities in access to healthcare.106 The brief identi-
fies that the exemption for “for-profit, secular businesses from federal
requirements” would materially harm society, “and, more specifically,
the related individual interest in managing one’s own reproductive
functions and health.”107 Thus, Lambda Legal’s awareness of the
power imbalance is not limited to the LGBT community as “being up
against” the law, but includes any group that has been discriminated
against “based on sex, gender identity and expression, sexual orienta-
tion, race, national or ethnic origin, age, disability, religion or politi-
cal views.”108 However, the amici brief uses this recognition of power
inequity among many groups as an opportunity to intervene on behalf
of LGBT rights.109
B. Consciousness of Opportunity in Which One Might Intervene
and Turn to One’s Advantage
Although neither Hobby Lobby nor Conestoga directly discusses the
rights of the LGBT community, Lambda Legal wrote in support of the
government as a means of turning a power imbalance into an advan-
tage.110 This element of resistance entails “a consciousness of both
constraint and autonomy, of power and possibility.”111 As seen in the
previous section, Lambda Legal understands the imbalance affecting
several groups,112 and uses this imbalance as an opportunity to further
104. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 183.
105. Brief for Lambda Legal, supra note 101, at *1 (also supported by Gay and Lesbian
Medical Association and Pride at Work—AFL-CIO).
106. Brief for Lambda Legal, supra note 101, at *1–2.
107. Id. at *4.
108. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 183; Brief for Lambda Legal, supra note 101, at *3.
109. Brief for Lambda Legal, supra note 101, at *6 (“Of particular interest to Amici are
laws protecting LGBT persons and those with HIV from discrimination in commercial con-
texts, including health care services.”).
110. Id. at *6.
111. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 183.
112. Brief for Lambda Legal, supra note 101, at *3 (“Pride at Work opposes all forms of
discrimination . . . .”).
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the rights of the LGBT community.113 The amici brief demonstrates
the dichotomy of constraint and autonomy through its use of case
law.114 Much like the game-like theory uses law to create space,115 the
Lambda Legal brief works within the framework that it is challenging
to achieve its resistance.116
Lambda Legal resists the traditional First Amendment frame-
work, which fails to consider the impacts on third parties, by focusing
the Court’s attention on the consequences of its decision.117 In stories
of resistance, the law is often described “as a giant, hobbled by its size
and blinded by its formality.”118 In this view, the size of the law ren-
ders it unable “to respond to the sorts of ordinary troubles that char-
acterize everyday life.”119 Thus, the law is “[m]ired in formal
procedure, captured by bureaucratic structures and. . . unable to ef-
fectively resolve disputes, recognize truth, or respond to injustice.”120
The amici brief resists this criticism by grounding the arguments in
personal stories.121 The brief introduces Kara, a lesbian whose doctor
told her that her sexual orientation was “‘against the Bible, [and]
against God[.]’”122 Another individual, Joe, tells a story of visiting his
doctor for depression after breaking up with his boyfriend of eight
years, and having his doctor recommend that Joe contact a minister
“who could help gay men repent and heal from sin” and that he
should date a woman to “get over” his depression.123
The amici brief further challenges and resists legality by recogniz-
ing a power imbalance and using that imbalance to assert non-tradi-
tional legal arguments.124 This form of resistance is similar to the
example explained in Commonplace of the Law, in which Egyptian wo-
113. Id. at *6 (“Of particular interest to Amici are laws protecting LGBT
persons . . . .”).
114. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 183; Brief for Lambda Legal, supra note 101, at
*21 (referencing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)).
115. See supra Section II.
116. Brief for Lambda Legal, supra note 101, at *22 (“This Court’s conclusion in Lee is
the governing rule.”).
117. See supra Section II (discussing that the legal framework of Free Exercise claims do
not consider the impacts on third parties).
118. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 196.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Brief for Lambda Legal, supra note 101, at *32.
122. Id. at *32–33.
123. Id. at *33.
124. Id. at *30 (“Amici sound alarm bells here because discriminatory limitations on
family health insurance . . . already contribute to persistent health disparities affecting the
constituencies they represent.”).
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men donned veils in order to continue working in the public
sphere.125 Through the use of “a traditional symbol of female subordi-
nation,” Egyptian women were able to “achieve a level of autonomy
and financial security” that otherwise would have been difficult to at-
tain.126 In the same way, Lambda Legal uses the legal formality of an
amici brief in order to promote the rights of groups that are not par-
ties to the litigation, which is a unique form of resistance.127
C. Assessment That Power Produces Unfair Constraints and
Opportunities
Resistance involves a synthesis that the power imbalance pro-
duces unfair constraints as well as unique opportunities.128 Not every
act of defiance is resistance; resistance “involves a justice claim and an
attribution of responsibility for the unfair situation.”129 In the Lambda
Legal brief, responsibility for the imbalance is attributed to religiously
motivated discrimination, and to those who perpetrate it.130 The brief
takes the stance that religious beliefs cannot be used to subordinate
the rights and autonomy of others.131 And, “permitting owners of for-
profit companies to interject themselves into employees’ home lives
. . . would subvert compelling interests in autonomy, public health,
and gender equity served by the rule the Companies resist.”132 The
brief continues that the corporations’ “proposed elevation of religious
rights to the detriment of others’ needs would, in addition to its ad-
verse effects for women’s health access and equality, worsen circum-
stances for LGBT people. . . .”133 Ultimately, Lambda Legal argues
that if the Court recognizes a religious exception to the ACA, the rip-
ple effects would be long-lasting and potentially disastrous.134 Thus,
the imbalance, originating in religious discrimination, is furthered by
the corporations’ requested religious exemption, because “the princi-
125. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 186.
126. Id. at 186.
127. Id. at 183 (“[R]esistance is not defined by the means that are employed, nor by
whether the action effectively realizes its objectives.”).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Brief for Lambda Legal, supra note 101, at *25.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *29.
133. Id. at *31.
134. Id. at *35 (“[T]he Companies’ quest for religious exemptions for commercial ac-
tivity poses a potentially devastating threat with distressing historical echoes.”).
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ple the Companies offer is not necessarily confined to employer-pro-
vided health insurance or medical services.”135
Consideration of the possible long-term effects focuses the assess-
ment of the power imbalance. If accepted, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood’s argument “would transform our society into one in which for-
profit businesses generally could claim religious immunity from the
full spectrum of generally applicable laws protecting people.”136
The claim for justice, therefore, is the “insistence that large com-
mercial enterprises provide comprehensive health insurance to all of
their employees.”137 But, in the same breath, the brief acknowledges
that “[r]eligious freedom is a core American value and burdens on it
can make for hard cases.”138 Although the means are clearly biased,
the goal of the amici is one shared by both parties: “a flourishing coex-
istence of the diverse religious, secular, and other belief systems that
animate our nation.”139 How, then, should the opposing views be
reconciled?
IV. Reconciliation
Reconciliation of opposing arguments at the heart of Hobby Lobby
and Conestoga Wood may only be accomplished by abandoning “the
sharp distinctions that [have] been drawn between the concepts of
structure and consciousness.”140 The reconciliation of legality requires
the harmonious coexistence of all the previously discussed theories,
all at once—legality’s power “rests on its ability to be played like a
game, to draw from and contribute to everyday life, and yet exist as a
realm removed and distanced from the commonplace affairs of partic-
ular lives.”141
The duality that appeared in several theories of legality reappears
in the reconciliation. It is the marginalized whose experiences are
least likely to have a voice in the culturally dominate schema of law
and who are most restricted in their access to the law, but are most
subject to its power.142 As a response, it is their voices that most need
135. Id. at *34.
136. Id. at *21.
137. Id. at *36.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 224.
141. Id. at 234.
142. Id. at 234–35.
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to be heard.143 An opportunity to rectify this power imbalance comes
in the form of storytelling.144 Stories of resistance “are a potent means
through which individual lives and experiences are able to transcend
the immediate and personal in such a way as to become socially mean-
ingful and potentially transformative.”145
The stories of those impacted should play a role in the Supreme
Court’s decision-making process. Stories of individuals facing the
“overwhelming power” of reified law can identify cracks in “legality’s
institutional facade” and “insist on human agency,” where legality
seeks to displace it.146 And, “by recognizing and reconciling the dual
threads of legality,” stories can create a middle ground “between the
conception of generalized reified legality and individual gamesmen
competing for themselves through legal forms.”147
While this Comment uses Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood as
model cases to illustrate the different views of the law—Before the
Law, With the Law, and Against the Law—the Supreme Court’s recent
decision, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., merits comment. Does the reifi-
cation process produce a false sense of objectivity? The Comment ar-
gued that the reification process rendered a concept of the law as
impartial—but is that concept accurate?
To answer this question, a distinction must be drawn between the
law itself and its application. Although one can hardly exist without
the other, even if the law—as an enduring body of generally accepted
principles—may be objective, its application cannot be. Ultimately,
any objectivity that the law obtains through the reification process
must be filtered through its inherently un-objective interpretation and
application by a judicial body.
In Burwell, the majority dutifully applies the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) framework to the Hahns’ and Greens’ case,
and Justice Ginsburg writes a sharp dissent; however, both the major-
ity and dissent illustrate how the legal framework limits the judicial
ability to consider the full spectrum of concerns presented by Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga Wood. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, and
Justice Ginsburg, writing the dissent, accept and embrace the tradi-
143. Id. at 236 (“The lack of correspondence between dominant cultural meanings and
the lives of the powerless persons can be discerned in the patters that emerged in the
numbers of problems . . . .”).
144. Id. at 241.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 244.
147. Id.
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tional RFRA analysis.148 The framework is well defined—the govern-
ment cannot substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
unless the government can prove that the challenged regulation is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest and uses the least
restrictive means possible.149 Even so, the two opinions come down on
opposite sides of the issue—divided over the compelling government
interest and the narrow tailoring of the mandate.
Both the majority and dissent use storytelling to strengthen their
views. Immediately before establishing that corporations are persons
entitled to pursue a RFRA claim, the majority discusses the Hahns and
the Greens, owners of the plaintiff corporations.150 While the owners
of the corporation have no impact on the legal analysis, humanizing
the corporations undoubtedly makes the majority’s decision an easier
pill to swallow. Although it is well established that a corporation is an
independent entity,151 telling the story of the corporations’ owners
has the subliminal effect of conflating where the owners’ interests end
and the corporations’ begin.152 Justice Ginsburg,153 meanwhile, strug-
gles to emphasize what the majority154 neglects—the burden that a
148. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767–85 (2014) (identifying
and applying the RFRA framework outlined in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b) in sections
III, IV, and V); id. at 2791–804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (identifying and applying the
RFRA framework outlined in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b) in section III).
149. RFRA, §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b).
150. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–67.
151. A corporation is defined as “a group or succession of persons established in accor-
dance with legal rules into a legal or juristic person that has a legal personality distinct
from the natural persons who make it up, exists indefinitely apart from them, and has the
legal powers that its constitution gives it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 415 (10th ed. 2014).
152. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. To the Third Circuit’s reasoning that secular, for-
profit corporations lack RFRA protection because business corporations “do not, separate
and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exer-
cise religion,” the Majority responded “[a]ll of this is true—but quite beside the point.”
Instead, in a near boundless endorsement of corporate personhood, Justice Alito wrote
that “[c]orporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are
employed by them, cannot do anything at all.” Id.
153. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In the Court’s view, RFRA demands accom-
modation for a for-profit corporation’s religious belief no matter the impact that accom-
modation may have on third parties who do not share the corporation owner’s religious
faith . . . .”); id. at 2790 (“Accommodations to religious beliefs or observances, the Court
has clarified, must not significantly impinge on the interests of third parties.”); see generally
id. at 2803–06 (considering the potential breadth of the majority’s religious exemption
reasoning, identifying the interest in having courts refrain from evaluating the merits of
religious claims against one another, and lamenting the Court’s “venture[ ] into a
minefield”).
154. Id. at 2779–83 (majority opinion). The majority appears skeptical of the govern-
ment’s asserted compelling interest in “promoting public health and gender equality,”
merely assuming, but not deciding, that “the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to
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Free Exercise exemption places on women—while staying within the
prescribed framework.
The selective use of storytelling creates drastically different focal
points. The majority’s narrative of the Hahns and Greens focuses on
the burdens placed on the corporations’ religious exercise to the ex-
clusion of the burden placed on women. This use of storytelling is not
the application of objective rules to objective facts, but rather the
adoption of a partial, and politicized, story to resolve the case.155 If,
then, we accept that the law’s application is not objective, and we al-
low the majority to tell a story of the corporate owners that is wholly
irrelevant to the legal analysis, then why not include a consideration
of the third parties impacted by the decision as a means of equalizing
the power imbalance between the culturally dominant ideology and
those without the voice to influence it?
Conclusion
At the heart of Kafka’s parable is the ambiguity regarding who
holds the power—the man, the doorkeeper, or the law. The door-
keeper appears to be the least powerful, admitting to being the lowest
of the doorkeepers, but in reality stands between the man and his
access to the law.156 The man’s death as an outsider to the law, having
never gained access, highlights the fatal implications of unequal ac-
cess to the law. Without equal access to the law, the system not only
“robs the poor of their only protection, but it places it in the hands of
their oppressors the most powerful and ruthless weapon ever in-
vented.”157 Thus, the use of storytelling creates a route into the law
without having to circumvent the gatekeepers. It allows the court to
consider the full spectrum of legal issues while adhering to the pre-
scribed legal framework.
the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA,”
and cautioning that “[e]ven a compelling interest may be outweighed in some circum-
stances by another weightier consideration.” Id. at 2779–80. While assuring that its relig-
ious exemption reasoning would not doom all insurance-coverage mandates, the Court
further assaults the legitimacy of ensuring universal access to contraceptive devices, ex-
plaining that some requirements, like immunizations, supported by different—and pre-
sumably more compelling interests—would survive. Id. at 2783.
155. Lisa Sarmas, Storytelling and the Law: A Case Study of Louth v. Diprose, 19 MELB. U. L.
REV. 701, 702 (1993–1994).
156. KAFKA, supra note 9, at xiii.
157. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL
OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION
BEFORE THE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 9
(1972).
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Through the use of story, legality can be reduced back to a social
construction, which is subject to change and challenge by the peo-
ple.158 Legality is no longer “a fixed and external entity,” but rather a
construct authored by humans, and thus subject to change.159 In this
way, the framework that binds the Court’s ability to make decisions in
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood can be harmonized with the need to
protect and recognize the rights of third parties, including women
and the LGBT community. And through this process, the opposing
arguments may be able to coexist in a diverse religious and secular
nation.
158. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 7, at 244.
159. Id.
